In People v. Lopez, --- Cal.Rptr.3d ----, 198 Cal.App.4th 698, 2011
WL 3632036 (Cal.App. 6 Dist.,2011.), the court resolved a question concerning prior bad acts, Evidence Code 1101, in favor of defendant.
The admission of prior bad acts involving theft required reversal
of a first degree burglary conviction where the prejudicial effect outweighed
the probative value. In limine the trial court ruled that the prosecution could
introduce evidence of a theft of a purse from a car, an admitted theft of an
iPod from a truck, and possession of a stolen vehicle on the basis that the
evidence was "probative of intent" without any elaboration or
detailed analysis to support the conclusion. The appellate court found abuse of
discretion because the issue of intent was a "foregone conclusion"
and there was no probative value to weigh against the significant prejudicial
effect of the three uncharged acts.
Evidence of prior uncharged acts is inadmissible to prove the
defendant's bad character, but may be admitted if relevant to prove motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of
mistake or accident, among other facts. (Evid.Code, § 1101, subds.(a), (b).)
CALCRIM No. 376 on possession of recently stolen property does not
reduce the prosecution's burden of proof, but prohibits the jury from drawing
an inference of guilt solely from possession, without more. The instruction is
a slight variation of CALJIC No. 2.15 which withstood similar challenges. The
reference to "slight evidence" does not reduce the prosecution's
burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case there was possession
of stolen property from several thefts as well as a burglary, giving rise to an
argument that the instruction could be applied without limitation and as
propensity evidence. However, the prosecutor in his opening statement
referenced the instruction and pointed to the possession of evidence taken in
the burglary as the basis for the inference to support the burglary charge.
The punishment for use of a stolen access card was properly
imposed in addition to punishment for theft of the purse that contained the
card. Penal Code section 654 was not violated by imposing concurrent sentences
because the trial court could have reasonably concluded that there were
multiple objectives: taking the purse and later using the card. There was no
indication that there was an intent to steal the access card while stealing the
purse; the objective of using the access card to obtain merchandise arose
later.
text © 2011 Darren Chaker. All Rights Reserved.
