Darren Chaker reflects on another new sex offender case in People
v. Miranda (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1403 [132 Cal.Rptr.3d 315].
Here, the court decided if the victim's capacity to consent
in a sex offense can be established by the jury's assessment of the victim's
demeanor. Appellant was convicted of attempted rape, oral copulation, and
sexual penetration of his 15-year-old granddaughter who suffered from cerebral
palsy. All three convictions were based on the theory that the victim was
incapable of giving legal consent to the acts because of a mental disorder or
developmental physical disability.
The appellate court rejected appellant's contention that
insufficient evidence was presented that the victim lacked the capacity to
consent due to a mental disorder. No expert testimony on this issue is
required. Here, sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented to establish
that the victim lacked capacity to consent: when assaulted, she did not respond
to the assailant’s question as to whether she liked the sexual assault; her
description of the assault at trial was childlike–one syllable responses and
hand gestures to direct questions; witnesses described her as suffering from
cerebral palsy with related seizures, and that she attended special education
classes, and had problems walking and talking.
Evidence of a prior false complaint may be excluded under
Evidence Code section 352 if its relevance is questionable, it is unclear, and
it involves layers of statements to develop its point. Evidence of a prior
false report of molestation is relevant to the credibility of the victim. Here,
defense counsel sought to introduce evidence that victim was listed as victim
and her father as a suspect in a prior molest incident. The appellate court
found no abuse of discretion in its exclusion because it was unclear who made
the complaint, the prosecutor claiming the victim’s mother complained to a
social worker; there was no showing that it was false; the evidence had a
potential for confusing the jury; and there was an independent witness in the
present case whereas there was no witness in the prior case.
Lifetime sex offender registration for a person convicted of
offenses against a victim incapable of consent does not violate equal
protection. The court rejected appellant's claim that lifetime registration
violated equal protection, finding that there was no showing that appellant was
in a class similarly situated to the individual for whom there is no lifetime
registration. (See People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 where defendant
was convicted of oral copulation of a 16-year-old-girl.) Unlike Hofsheier,
appellant was convicted of violent, nonconsensual crimes.
© 2011 Darren Chaker. All Rights Reserved.
