Darren-Chaker Custodial Arrest and Miranda

In Howes v. Fields , the Supreme Court held that police questioning of a prison inmate about misconduct occurring prior to incarceration, alone, does not constitute "custodial" for Miranda purposes. Darren Chaker also reports about detentions and fourth amendment issues on a separate blog.

Nonetheless, while serving a sentence in jail, Fields was questioned about alleged sexual conduct with a minor. He was not first advised of his Miranda rights. The lower court, advancing a categorical rule that (1) imprisonment, (2) questioning in private, and (3) questioning about events in the outside world created a "custodial" situation for Miranda purposes found a Miranda violation.

For the following reasons, the Supreme Court ruled that this rule did not represent a correct interpretation of Miranda case law. (1) Under existing law, imprisonment alone is not enough to create a custodial situation for Miranda purposes. Rather, the imprisonment must be such that a reasonable person would not feel he was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. (2) Questioning in private does not convert a non custodial situation to one requiring Miranda advisement. Quite the opposite–in the context of a jail setting, rather than removing a prisoner from a supportive atmosphere, a concern addressed by the Miranda court, questioning the inmate in private may serve to protect him from other inmates. (3) Finally, questioning about outside activities does not result in Miranda custody. Although the questioning may ultimately result in additional criminal liability, it would do so no more than questioning about criminal activity within the jail.

© 2011 Darren Chaker. All Rights Reserved.

Altered Evidence and Double Jeopardy by Darren Chaker

Retrial after mistrial is not barred by double jeopardy where the prosecutor deliberately altered defendant's statements to make it appear as though the defendant lied, in an effort to convict her says the Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Lopez-Avila, as does Darren Chaker.

During cross examination of the defendant in a drug trafficking case, the prosecutor read back supposed language of defendant, made during a earlier change of plea proceeding (the plea was later withdrawn). What he read back appeared to contradict the defendant's trial testimony; based on this, the prosecutor accused defendant of lying. However, the prosecutor had presented an altered version of the earlier exchange; the true statement reflected defendant had not contradicted herself.

When the defense attorney discovered the prosecutor's misrepresentation, he moved for a mistrial, which was granted. The defense then moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice on double jeopardy grounds, but this was denied by the district court. Affirmed. Under Oregon v. Kennedy (1982) 456 U.S. 667, double jeopardy bars retrial after a defense-requested mistrial is granted "only where the government conduct in question is intended to 'goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial." In this case, the prosecutor’s misrepresentation was intended to secure a conviction. "In other words . . . the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial when a prosecutor's misconduct aims to 'burn' the jury, but not when he merely aims to convict the defendant by methods foul." In this case, double jeopardy does not bar retrial under the Oregon v. Kennedy "goading" exception.

© 2011 Darren Chaker. All Rights Reserved.